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responsibility in this respect. Nor will it be easily accepted that we have nothing to learn for our ethical philosophy, to say nothing of our moral guidance, by studying the struggles and achievements of the past.

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Prinzipien der psychologischen Erkenntnis: Prolegomena zu einer Kritik der historischen Vernunft. Von WALTER STRICH. Beiträge zur Philosophie, Nr. 5. Heidelberg, Carl Winters Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1914.—pp. vi, 363.

This book adds one more to the long list of books and articles dealing with the principles of psychology. In all this literature only one point seems to be absolutely clear, viz., that there is no substantial agreement about psychology, either in respect to its aim or its accomplishment. The exact nature of the principles which the psychologist must use to explain mind is apparently as much in doubt to-day as ever it was, a sad disillusionment for those who, only a generation ago, thought the problem was solved with the creation of the psychological laboratory. This disagreement does not, indeed, justify the scepticism which sees in mind an object so complex as forever to defy conceptual analysis, for it may be that the present ebullition of psychological methodology is only the prologue to a period of great psychological discoveries, somewhat as the early seventeenth century ushered in the physical sciences with a welter of logical speculation. Even now, perhaps, some psychologist is developing in use a method which, by its fruitfulness, will do for psychology what Galileo's work did for physics. Controversy over method may well be essential to progress, but until a recognized method shall emerge, the logical controversy is doomed at least to appear unfruitful, and to estimate accurately the value of any contribution to the controversy must remain impossible.

Accordingly we approach the present criticism of the principles of psychology with a measure of scepticism not shared by the author. For Dr. Strich the problem is an analysis of reason itself, and the results are to be legislative for the procedure of psychology; his purpose, indeed, is to show that an explanatory psychology is in principle impossible and that all such attempts are on a wrong tack. The object of his analysis of psychological principles is to lay the foundation for a critique of reason supplementary to that of Kant, which he seems to regard as final so far as it goes. Kant's critique, however, contains a dogmatic element in so far as Kant assumed that his pure reason is identical with reason in general (p. 4). Epistemo-

logical monism, which assumes that causality is the only instrument of knowledge, must be supplanted by epistemological dualism, which is based on the proof that knowledge of the mental does not follow the causal law. What is required is a critique of historical reason which shall do for the mental sciences what Kant did for the physical sciences. Such a critique would lay the logical foundation of history; the present work, however, is only the prolegomena. The principles which Dr. Strich seeks, therefore, are conceived by him as *a priori* forms of reason analogous and supplementary to Kant's categories. Kant himself, Dr. Strich holds, recognized the need for such supplementation when he assigned a value to teleology as a regulative principle in biology.

If we neglect the claim to *a priori* validity, it is clear that Dr. Strich's conception of a critique of historical reason involves two questions which may be, and in fact have been, considered as independent. The first and most general of these is the logic of the historical sciences, a question on which much has been written during the last few years, especially in Germany. The discontent with Kant's one-sided devotion to the physical sciences might almost be called general, and is a natural consequence of the fact that the historical and social sciences were as absorbing an intellectual interest for the nineteenth century as the physical sciences were for the eighteenth. This tendency may well be recognized as one likely to produce lasting changes in philosophy; indeed its effects are already well marked. The second question is the one to which Dr. Strich more particularly devotes himself, the question of the logical nature of psychology. He seems to consider it self-evident that the historical sciences are mental sciences and that psychology is the foundation of them (Preface). This is of course the traditional opinion, but it requires some justification in view of the fact that the most elaborate attempt so far to establish a logic for the historical sciences has taken another position. Windelband and Rickert have insisted that the historical sciences do not and cannot formulate laws of nature, but they regard a 'nomothetic' psychology as possible; hence they abandon the distinction between physical and mental sciences and deny the dependence of the historical sciences on psychology. Dr. Strich, on the other hand, keeps the familiar alignment of the sciences and regards the attempt to state laws in psychology as a blunder. The historical sciences are mental sciences and psychology is the fundamental historical science.

The fundamental opposition on which Dr. Strich bases his epis-

temological dualism is that between space and time. "Kant investigated knowledge only in so far as it is connected with space. There is, however, a knowledge which must be characterized precisely by the lack of space as a method" (p. 5). The distinction is between the categories by which phenomena are to be thought. In themselves phenomena as they are perceived are neither physical nor psychical. Metaphysically the world may be said to be merely the infinitely many series of the experiences of subjects; it is a world of monads, each monad having its own world of experience (p. 15). Tones and colors, for example, are in general merely *Weltbestimmtheiten;* they can be thought as belonging to nature, the system of things related causally in space, or to the subject, which is a temporal unity subsisting merely in the conscious relations of its contents (pp. 9 f.). Hence follow all the essential characteristics of the two kinds of knowledge. Natural science constructs the concept of a 'one' world in space, a world consisting of timeless elements causally related. No element in this world has a history, for each is eternal and unchangeable, except in respect to its spatial relations. The mental, on the other hand, belongs to no 'world' but only to the monad, the temporal system of the subject. Hence there are no mental elements, the relations of which 'in' consciousness psychology can formulate; the theory of mental elements, to the refutation of which the author devotes much attention, is an unwarranted spatializing of mind. There are only moments of experience which are felt as like other moments or different, and in all cases this identification is a purely mental process not explainable by the objective likeness of the stimuli. Moreover, what we call a moment is determined solely by the synthesis of experience. The subject is not 'in' time, as the scientist understands time; it *is* time, a series of absolute moments (pp. 51 f.). Clearly, then, psychological knowledge is historical, since any moment can be understood only by its relations in the sequence of moments; similarly, there can be only individual psychology, since there is no mental 'world' but only the moments of monads.

The point of view of the book thus outlined in Chapter I is elaborated and applied in the later chapters with considerable repetition. The fundamental category of historical reason is will (Chapter III). As selective attention, will is active in both thought and perception; in no case can this selective capacity be explained by association or by the effect of the stimulus. Will is not a phenomenon but 'an idea *a priori* of the psychological reason' (p. 101). Its act must be conceived as a creation out of nothing (p. 97). In the historical reason,

therefore, end plays a rôle analogous to that of cause in pure reason, for a temporal unity implies an end (p. 129). In a developing series the end is present from the beginning as immanent determination or will (pp. 134, 144). The opposition between the pure and the historical reason thus corresponds to that between what is and what ought to be (p. 169). "The reality of the historical moment is not grounded in a preceding reality of which it is merely a change, but only in the reality of the historical subject. As the act or creation of this it exists. Real time is an eternal creation out of nothing" (p. 170). "The world, historically considered, we can define only through the act of the ego" (p. 194).

The conception of the subject, however, is extended to include the organism, and therefore biology is held to be an historical science; 'soul is only another name for the unity of life' (p. 161). Life or the organism is a necessary category of thought, a principle *a priori* (pp. 57, 110, 159 f.). Biogenetic laws, therefore, are not laws of nature; they are only the recounting of a self-repeating history (p. 134). In general, the individual nature of psychology is no bar to generalization (pp. 322 ff.). Events may be repeated without end and individuals may be alike to any extent; there is therefore a psychology of groups, *e. g.*, of Americans or of artists. In no case, however, can these generalizations be called laws of nature, since the latter term applies only to the relations of timeless elements.

The aim of pure reason is explanation (*Erklären*); that of historical reason is understanding (*Verstehen*). Psychology is intuitive rather than inductive; ultimately psychological knowledge is self-knowledge. The thought or action of another can be understood only in so far as it can be re-experienced in ourselves; we understand another only when we realize his purposes and the situation in which he acts, ultimately when we understand his character. For psychology, then, the standpoint of solipsism is justified; only so far as likeness exists is there a bridge from one monad to another (p. 320). The process thus described, while it refers to an obvious fact, is scarcely adequate as an account of sympathetic knowledge. The mere similarity of my experience with another's would surely never convince me that these experiences really belonged to another. The author, however, does not discuss the relations between his monads.

It is evident that Dr. Strich's analysis of the historical reason brings together concepts that at least appear to be very different. Granting that biology, psychology, and history do involve real process and that the physical sciences do not, it is still a question whether their

differences are not logically more important than their similarity. In particular, history is not thus accounted for. The historical interest in events as unique appears to be a different kind of interest from that in processes which are indefinitely repeated, even though both may equally be processes. The fact is that Dr. Strich overestimates the logical differences between the generalizations of biology and psychology on the one hand and those of the physical sciences on the other. It is indeed true that the former do not concern 'timeless' elements but only the repetitions of temporal unities. But the laws of timeless elements do not have a sort of generality at large, as he seems to suppose. They are hypothetical statements of something that is universally true under certain conditions. What these conditions are is not determined *a priori* but by the needs of the science. If, then, it should be necessary, as Dr. Strich supposes, to assume the organism as a category, certain propositions might be universally true under the conditions imposed by that category. Such propositions would then be logically similar in nature to the laws of mechanics, even though they carried a teleological implication, and the relations expressed would be as 'timeless' as those between two atoms. The same is true of psychological generalizations. The more fundamental distinction would then lie, as Rickert maintains, between these efforts to generalize, from whatever point of view, and the historical interest which aims to express the individuality of its subject matter in a series of unique values.

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A History of Philosophy. By FRANK THILLY. New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1914.—pp. xv, 612.

The idea of an orthodox philosophy is, to use Berkeley's phrase, a manifest repugnancy, and nothing is more abhorrent to the spirit of philosophy than the attempt to give the student the one tenable theory of the universe; as nothing is more distressing to a teacher than to have his pupil bolt his ideas and regurgitate them, on demand, for inspection. So, in spite of the familiar criticisms, which recur at regular intervals, the introduction to philosophy by way of its history remains the best method of approach, for it is the only way in which a student has any chance of being protected from the prejudices of his instructor. Prejudices may, indeed, peep through the cloak of impartiality in which the historian hides, but a free use of the sources will minimize their influence. One sends a student to the history of philosophy that he may sojourn for a while in the worlds of those whose vision has been broadest, in order that he may be able to face